

Выбор в пользу территориальных воинских формирований в Мексике: создание мексиканской Национальной гвардии

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«Национальная гвардия не гарантирует правосудия, ни в коем случае утешения или сдерживания, которое дает ограниченный и кратковременный результат. Это решение представляет собой путь милитаризации вопреки функциям гражданских институтов».

Луис Рауль Гонсалес Перес

Омбудсмен / Национальная комиссия по правам человека

Палата депутатов, 9 января 2019 года

АННОТАЦИЯ

Процесс милитаризации общественной безопасности в Мексике представлен в двух формах: непосредственное участие вооруженных сил в области внутренней безопасности и создание и развитие так называемых “территориальных воинских формирований” или военизированных организаций,

управляемых военнослужащими, из которых они состоят. В рамках данной работы был рассмотрен процесс создания Национальной гвардии и отхода на второй план федеральной полиции, имеющей гражданский характер, а также усиление процесса милитаризации общественной безопасности.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА

Территориальные воинские формирования - Военизированные организации - Национальная гвардия США - Национальная гвардия Франции - Мексика.

The Choice for Intermediate Forces in Mexico: The Birth of the Mexican National Guard

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“The National Guard does not guarantee justice, in any case deterrence or containment that has limited and short-term effects. This decision constitutes a path of militarization, in opposition to functions of civil institutions”.

Luis Raúl González Pérez

Ombudsman / Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos

Chamber of Deputies, 9th January 2019

ABSTRACT

The process of militarization of public security in Mexico is presented under two modalities: the direct engagement of the Armed Forces in the field of internal security and the creation and development of so-called intermediate forces or paramilitary forces, often commanded

and made up of military personnel. Throughout this contribution, a review of the process of creating the National Guard and the disappearance of the federal police with a civil profile and the consolidation of the process of militarization of public security.

KEY WORDS

Intermediate forces – paramilitary forces – Nacional Guard – Gendarmerie – Mexico.

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

Throughout the historical evolution of Mexico, the successive governments — including those of political alternation have used the armed forces as the primary response to public insecurity and violence.

However, this process of militarization — the direct commitment of the military in the field of public security — is subjected to a continuous transformation.

This change occurs with the creation of the National Gendarmerie in 2014 as a division of the federal police and, more recently, with the appearance of the National Guard under the command of the army.

The presidential agreement that the Armed Forces have to carry out public security tasks to the aid of the National Guard^[1] will add five more years of military intervention in the streets^[2].

Therefore, the choice is in favor of intermediate forces or militarized police that privilege the repressive function of the State. This is the legacy of continental Europe and the antithesis of the civil police of Anglo-Saxon tradition.

The purpose of this article is to account for the process of creating the National Guard in Mexico from the doctrine of intermediate forces.

ABOUT INTERMEDIATE FORCES

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes: “In the majority of States the law enforcement bodies are civilian

in origin and nature and are usually attached to the Ministry of the Interior or of Justice. Other States entrust law enforcement responsibility to military or paramilitary bodies, which operate under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence”^[3].

This last type of bodies is called security forces, also known as intermediate forces in the doctrine. Napoleon I, in a letter addressed to the King of Naples, described the French National Gendarmerie (from French “gens d’armes”, men-at-arms) as a unique force in Europe that brings the most reliable information, “half civilian, half military”^[4]. For this reason, the Gendarmerie had a double historical belonging to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence (since January 2009 this institution is attached to the Ministry of Interior), it is considered as reserve for the armed forces, has a military status, it is capable of combat in case of an armed conflict and its disciplinary regime is based in the code of military justice.

It is noteworthy than in the world there are two main models of intermediate forces: the National Guard of the United States of America and the National Gendarmerie of France. The “structure and organization [of these forces] will also depend on the political organization of the State [...] tend to have a strict hierarchical (military-type) set-up with as many functional levels as there are different ranks. They are mainly closed

[1] How we began. // National Guard – 2019. – URL: <https://www.nationalguard.mil/about-the-guard/how-we-began/> (access mode: 21.01.2021).

[2] ACUERDO por el que se dispone de la Fuerza Armada permanente para llevar a cabo tareas de seguridad pública de manera extraordinaria, regulada, fiscalizada, subordinada y complementaria. // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 2020. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5593105&fecha=11/05/202 (access mode: 23.02.2021).

[3] De Rover C. To Serve and to Protect. Human rights and humanitarian law for police and security forces. Second Edition, Revised and updated by A. Bienert. – Geneva: ICRC, 2014. – P. 133. – URL: <https://shop.icrc.org/catalogsearch/result?q=Serve+and+protect> (access mode: 20.02.2021).

[4] Quel avenir pour la gendarmerie?. Rapport d’information n°27 (2007-2008) fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères. // Sénat. – Paris, 2008. – URL: https://www.senat.fr/rap/r07-271/r07-271_mono.html#toc0, (access mode: 15.01.2021).

systems and most decision-making processes are of the “top-down variety”^[5].

The intermediate forces are a hard nucleus of the police in which the personnel have a “military state”. These forces have their origins in the two biggest revolutionary movements of the XVIII century: the independence of the Thirteen colonies in North-America and the French Revolution, with the creation of the National Guard and the Gendarmerie Nationale respectively^[6].

These coercive instruments correspond to the first historical manifestations of the Rule of Law — also known as Liberal Rule of Law — because the emphasis of the functions of the state apparatus relate to freedom and right to security^[7].

The advantages of having this type of security forces is that in case of internal disturbances and tensions that surpasses the capacities of the civilian police, there is no need to use the armed forces^[8].

Lutterbeck summarized the debate on the existence of these intermediate forces in the following way: “Analysis typically view the persistence of gendarmerie or paramilitary forces as somewhat of an anachronism or anomaly. Representing a continuation of military or quasi-military presence in domestic security, their existence is of course at odds with one of the basic principles — and indeed achievements — of the modern nation-state, at least in its liberal-democratic

form: the separation between police and military. As militarized police forces, they are also often associated with authoritarian or repressive tendencies, and are seen as a potential threat to civil liberties. In the following, however, it is argued that despite, or actually because of, their anomalous status, such intermediary forces have gained tremendously importance over recent years. Precisely because they combine the characteristics of police and military forces, they have come to play an increasingly salient role of the post-Cold War security agenda: in the field of border control [...] and that of peace support operations [...]”^[9].

Also Easton and Moelker add to the academic debate on the militarization of the police. He “[...] concentrates on two paradoxical trends. On the one hand, attention is being paid to the military character of police organizations, an issue which has been discussed since the advent of modern police forces [...] The core of this discussion is the impact of the military structure and culture on different aspects of our society. In the 19th and 20th centuries and up until now, military organizational principles are for example implemented in different kind of organizations such as religious groups, youth associations, hospitals and the police [...] On the other hand, the development of democracies raises questions about how to democratize/demilitarize police forces to meet all the requirements of a modern

[5] De Rover C. To Serve and to Protect. Human rights and humanitarian law for police and security forces. Second Edition, Revised and updated by A. Bienert. – Geneva: ICRC, 2014. – P. 133, 327. – URL: <https://shop.icrc.org/catalogsearch/result/?q=Serve+and+protect> (access mode: 20.02.2021).

[6] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 16-17.

[7] Díaz E. Estado de Derecho y sociedad democrática. – Madrid: Taurus, 1985.

[8] Moloeznik M.P. Internal Disturbances and Tensions. / D. Djukic and N. Pons // The Companion to International Humanitarian Law. – Leiden and Boston: Brill and Nijoff Publishers, 2018. – P. 416-417.

[9] Lutterbeck D. Between Police and Military. The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries, Cooperation and Conflict. // Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association. – 2004. – Vol. 39, Issue 1. – P. 50-51.

constitutional state. The concept of community policing is at the center of this trend [...] Both trends are useful to conceptualize the impact of the blurring boundaries between the police and the armed forces upon the organizational and operational functioning of police forces all over the world”^[10].

Currently, “the global trend of having civilian commands among the public security institutions is very clear: 75% of the countries have a complete or predominantly civilian command [...] In the last 20 years, countries such as Austria, Belgium, El Salvador, Guatemala, Luxemburg, Serbia, and Ukraine, have pushed reforms to disappear the gendarmeries and have only civilian bodies”^[11].

Regardless of the different positions, the intermediate forces are ad hoc coercive instruments to respond to the risks and threats to security in the Post-Westphalian era^[12] such as transnational organized crime and terrorism (through the border control and its presence in areas in where the state is weak). Threats to the international peace and security – by taking part in Peacekeeping missions^[13] –, and other situations of violence in the domestic sphere, such as maintaining law and public order^[14].

UNITED STATES NATIONAL GUARD

The National Guard has its origins in the independence of the thirteen colonies based on the concept of “nation and people in arms” of the XVIII century. This concept consisted of a system of citizen militias, conformed by armed volunteers fighting for an independent nation, genesis of second generation wars^[15].

The National Guard reflects the federal model/pact, because each state of the Union has this coercive instrument to its disposal and the governor is the supreme commander. Furthermore: “[...] at federal level, at regional/State level and sometimes even at municipal level. This often goes hand in hand with decentralized legislative powers and hence different laws governing the responsibilities and powers of the different structures at the federal, regional/state and municipal level”^[16].

The National Guard can be defined as the local armed force, composed by citizens and trained by the respective state authorities, to defend and preserve the sovereignty of the country, peace and internal order. In cases of emergency, this force is capable to solve critical situations, without mobiliz-

[10] Easton. M. and Moelker R. Police and Military: two worlds apart? Current Challenges in the Process of Constabularisation of the Armed Forces and Militarisation of the Civilian Police. / M. Easton, et al (eds.). // *Blurring of Military and Police Roles*. – The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2010. – P. 2.

[11] Sánchez Valdés V. M. Seguridad pública en el mundo: ¿quién está al mando? – Nexos, 7 January 2019. – URL: <https://seguridad.nexos.com.mx/seguridad-publica-en-el-mundo-quien-esta-al-mando/> (access mode: 10.01.2021)

[12] Arcudi G. Forces de police et forces armées, sécurité et défense: où sont les frontières? / M. Liechti, G. Arcudi and M. Vonlanthen. // *Frontiers entre police et armée*. – Genève: Institut International de Recherches pour la Paix à Genève, Cahier du Gipri (2), 2004. – P. 17–34.

[13] Friesendorf C. International Intervention and the Use of Force: Military and Police Roles. // The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). – 2012. – URL: <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/383260469.pdf> (access mode: 15.01.2021).

[14] To Serve and to Protect: Guide for Police Conduct and Behavior. // International Committee of the Red Cross. – Geneva: ICRC, 2015. – P. 7. – URL: <https://shop.icrc.org/to-serve-and-to-protect-guide-for-police-conduct-and-behaviour-first-aid-print-en> (access mode: 19.01.2021).

[15] Moloeznik M.P. Public Order and Safety / D. Djukic and N. Pons // *The Companion to International Humanitarian Law*. – Leiden and Boston: Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, 2018. – P. 49–50.

[16] De Rover C. To Serve and to Protect. Human rights and humanitarian law for police and security forces. Second Edition, Revised and updated by Anja Bienert. – Geneva: ICRC, 2014. – P. 133. – URL: <https://shop.icrc.org/catalogsearch/result/?q=Serve+and+protect> (access mode: 19.01.2021).

ing the Army, or bring an effective control until the military arrives.

It is an intermediate force or militarized police that has a double nature, civilian and military at the same time, which justifies the constitutional power of the President of the United States to use it in cases of emergency, catastrophes or armed conflict, in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The National Guard is a coercive instrument capable to deal with emergencies and situations that can be considered as gray areas, between war and peace, that the ICRC names other situations of violence (OSV)^[17]. Consequently, it must be considered as a body used for reaction/repression, with personnel that is trained to face international armed conflicts (interstate or traditional) as well as non-international (intra-social) using the highest intensity of the force of a State, which legitimately monopolizes the use of force.

Summarizing, the United State National Guard is a decentralized model with a part time nature that comes from 1636, although recognized as part of the armed forces of the emerging American state in 1775. It is formed with citizens that voluntarily join it and decide to use their free time in serving for this institution, while keeping their main civilian activity. Federalism constitutes a distinctive mark, because each state of the United States has its own National Guard to – in principle – respond to emergency situations, natural disasters or public disorders.

GENDARMERIE NATIONALE OF FRANCE

This corporation responds to the traditional conception of public order, foreseen in the Napoleonic Code of the XIX century^[18]. Characterized by its military and centralized structure, extended throughout the entire territory, it focuses in the protection and extension of the political power of the governing persons or groups. Repressive and reactive on crime and at the service of the princes or State, with the ultimate goal to maintain public order^[19].

The particularity of the gendarmerie is that it constitutes a police force with a military status: the gendarme is defined as the “soldier of law” because it is a military in charge of a police mission, the same manner as a police officer. As established in Article 1 of the decree of 20 May 1903: “the gendarmerie is a force established to guarantee the public security and maintain the law and order”.

It is essentially a military force because of its organization, missions and values. It is also known as the “fourth branch of the army”^[20].

This military dimension is very notorious in terms of its *modus operandi* and characteristics (life in barracks and use of uniforms in particular); its ceremonialism and symbolism (for instance, its oath); and also for the status and spirit of its personnel.

[17] Moloeznik M.P. Internal Disturbances and Tensions. / D. Djukic and N. Pons // *The Companion to International Humanitarian Law*. – Leiden and Boston: Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, 2018. – P. 516-517.

[18] Moloeznik M.P. Public Order and Safety / D. Djukic and N. Pons // *The Companion to International Humanitarian Law*. – Leiden and Boston: Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, 2018. – P. 590.

[19] Balbé M. Modelos policiales comparados. // VII Seminario “Duque de Ahumada”, Seguridad y Estado Autonómico. – Madrid: Ministerio del Interior, 1996. – P. 113-127.

[20] Quel avenir pour la gendarmerie?. Rapport d'information n°27 (2007-2008) fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères. // Sénat. – Paris, 2008. – URL: https://www.senat.fr/rap/r07-271/r07-271_mono.html#toc0, (access mode: 15.01.2021).

The gendarmes are professional soldiers (career), subject to the military chief of staff (code of military justice) as defined by the law of 24 March 2005. According to it, it is forbidden for a gendarme, as for any other military personnel, to be associated with any political group or association. Furthermore, it is subjected to the duty of reserve, obligation of not diminishing the neutrality of the armies, prohibition to go on strike and freedom of association.

According to Vaultier: "The Gendarmerie National's missions are as follows: public order, restoring order, counterterrorist intervention, criminal investigation, prevention, assistance and rescue missions, surveillance of the territory and overseas police and military police [...] Overall, the activity of the gendarmerie breaks down into 50 percent civil defense, 40 percent criminal investigation, and 10 percent military missions"^[21].

In this framework, the ICRC^[22] recognizes that: "Maintaining law and order is the responsibility of civil authorities. It is the task of the civil police and/or of paramilitary troops, such as gendarmeries, which are specially equipped, organized and trained for such missions".

The political-administrative organization of France responds to the centralized nature of its State and therefore: "[...] the law enforcement body will usually

be an equally centralized monolithic body with a vertical chain of command extending from the top central level to the lowest local level"^[23].

In a summary, the Gendarmerie Nationale of France (1791) is a centralized and full-time model. It is a unique body that exercises its jurisdiction in all French territory, including the possessions overseas. Its members commit their entire life to this career that has two scales, one for the officials that will exercise the command and the other for the execution of the orders (gendarmes and non-commissioned officers).

THE BIRTH OF THE MEXICAN NATIONAL GUARD

The "Alternative Project of Nation 2018 – 2024" of the National Regeneration Movement (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional "MORENA") that endorsed Andrés Manuel López Obrador to the presidency of Mexico, constitutes a diagnosis of the hecatomb in which Enrique Peña Nieto^[24] leaves the country after his mandate, however this "Project" practically does not include proposals of public policy.

The only exception to the absence of proposals is the announcement of the creation of the National Guard, without clarifying a definition of this body or what its missions and functions would be.

[21] Vaultier D. The Military's Role in Homeland Security in France. / J. L. Clarke // *Armies in Homeland Security. American and European Perspectives*. – Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2006. – P. 214-215. – URL: <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481961> (access mode: 19.02.2021).

[22] Violence and the Use of Force. // International Committee of the Red Cross. – Geneva: ICRC, 2015. – P. 6 – URL: <https://shop.icrc.org/violence-et-usage-de-la-force-871.html> (access mode: 8.02.2021).

[23] De Rover C. To Serve and to Protect. Human rights and humanitarian law for police and security forces. Second Edition, Revised and updated by Anja Bienert. – Geneva: ICRC, 2014. – P. 133. – URL: <https://shop.icrc.org/catalogsearch/result/?q=Serve+and+protect> (access mode: 19.01.2021).

[24] Wilkinson D. México: la militarización de la seguridad pública. // Human Rights Watch, 4 October 2018. – URL: <https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2018/10/04/mexico-la-militarizacion-de-la-seguridad-publica> (access mode: 15.01.2021).

Shortly before taking position as President López Obrador^[25] presents the “2018 – 2024 Peace and Security Plan”.

In the plan, “[...] it is enunciated a radically different public security paradigm completely different from what has been applied in the previous six years [...]”^[26]; while recognizing that: “[...] the police and martial strategy applied in the last twelve years has left a human and social tragedy of incalculable dimensions: more than 200 thousand people killed and more than 37 thousand are missing –of which almost five thousand are minors– a hardly calculable number of people displaced by violence and millions of people who have had to modify their life patterns to protect themselves”^[27].

Within this framework, it is proposed to rethink national security and reorient the Armed Forces; because: “If the Army and Navy have experienced attrition and loss of confidence among some sectors of the population, this has been due to orders from the civil command to participate in repressive actions or in police functions for which these institutions have not been empowered or trained”^[28].

However, “In the absence of a professional police institution capable of facing the challenge of insecurity and violence, it is necessary to continue to have the military institutions in the preservation and recovery of the public security and the fight against crime [...] These circumstances lead us to propose that, without abandoning

its constitutional obligations to ensure the national security and territorial integrity of the country (including its airspace and the territorial sea), the preservation of National sovereignty and assistance to the population in cases of disaster, our Armed Forces participate in the construction of peace through a leading role in the formation, structuring and training of the National Guard, which should assume the functions of preserving strategic facilities and civil protection at the federal level in all its facets, beyond conjuncture nature of the Plan of DN-III (natural disasters)”^[29].

Thus, the creation of the National Guard is proposed, “[...] as the primary instrument of the federal Executive power to prevent crime, preserve public safety, recover of peace and the fight against crime throughout the country”^[30].

It is conceived as “[...] similar to corporations such as the French National Gendarmerie, an armed force responsible for the police missions, and the Spanish Civil Guard, an armed institute of a military nature that performs public security functions. [...] The personnel of the new body will come from the Military and Naval police, as well as the current Federal Police, and additionally civilians and troop elements will be summoned to contribute in the formation of new elements, which will receive training in military facilities, according to a curriculum developed jointly

[25] López Obrador A.M. Plan de Paz y Seguridad 2018-2014. – 25 November 2018. – URL: <https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/plan-nacional-de-paz-y-seguridad/> (access mode: 15.01.2021).

[26] López Obrador A.M. Plan de Paz y Seguridad 2018-2024. – 25 November 2018. – P. 3. – URL: https://lopezobrador.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PLAN-DE-PAZ-Y-SEGURIDAD_ANEXO.pdf (access mode: 15.01.2021).

[27] Ibid. – P. 10.

[28] Ibid. – P. 14.

[29] López Obrador A.M. Plan de Paz y Seguridad 2018-2024. – 25 November 2018. – P. 16. – URL: https://lopezobrador.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PLAN-DE-PAZ-Y-SEGURIDAD_ANEXO.pdf (access mode: 15.01.2021).

[30] Ibid. – P. 17-18.

by the Ministries of Defense, Navy, Interior and Citizen Security [...] The permanent tasks of formation of elements will depend on the Military Education System with civil and military teachers”^[31].

Finally, a term of three years is set for the new corporation to reach full institutional and operational functioning with a state of force of 50,000 troops, which allows it to cover the 266 regions in which it is planned to divide the country (delimited by the amount population and crime incidence); and, at the same time, it is recorded that “the operational command of the National Guard will be in charge of officers of the Mexican Army or, in the coastal areas, of the Mexican Navy”^[32].

In case there was any doubt about the operational dimension, the document states that: “The Ministry of Defense will assume the operational command of the National Guard, the recruitment, training and organization of its troops, as well as its equipment, deployment and operability, based on the requirements indicated by the Security Coordinations and in compliance with the guidelines of action elaborated by the Secretariat of Citizen Security”^[33].

In this context, in November 2018, legislators of the parliamentary group of the MORENA party in the Congress (Chamber of Deputies) presented an initiative to reform various articles of the Constitution, which was referred

to the Committee on Constitutional Points, an instance that in December approved the respective opinion and sent it to the Review Chamber on January 2019.

The main contents of the proposal are:

- That the federation has a police institution of civil character and hierarchy called National Guard, responsible for security tasks that safeguard the life, liberty/freedom, integrity and heritage of people, and, the preservation of assets and resources of the nation.

- The organic structure of the National Guard would be attached to the secretariat of the security branch and would have a Board of Chiefs of Staff composed of members of the ministries of Security, Defense and Marine.

- The representation of the Ministry of Security would formulate the national program in this area and the operational programs, policies, strategies and actions. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense would arrange for the hierarchical/command structure, discipline, service regime, promotions, benefits, income, professionalization and fulfillment of the responsibilities and tasks of the National Guard, that should be identical to those that apply in the Armed Forces^[34].

In November 2018, the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration is reformed and the Secretariat of Citizen Security and Protection (SCSP) is created, transferring all the powers assigned to the Ministry

[31] Ibid. – P. 17-18.

[32] Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública. / Government of Mexico. // Gaceta. – 1 February 2019. – URL: https://infosen.senado.gob.mx/sbsp/gaceta/64/1/2019-02-01-1/assets/documentos/Estrategia_Seguridad.pdf (access mode: 15.01.2021).

[33] López Obrador A.M. Plan de Paz y Seguridad 2018-2024. – 25 November 2018. – P. 19. – URL: https://lopezobrador.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/PLAN-DE-PAZ-Y-SEGURIDAD_ANEXO.pdf (access mode: 15.01.2021).

[34] González Rodríguez J. de J. Guardia Nacional en México. LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. // Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública. Carpeta Informativa. – February 2019. – P. 8. – URL: <http://www5.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/camara/Centros-de-Estudio/CESOP/Novedades/Carpeta-informativa-Guardia-Nacional-en-Mexico> (access mode: 17.02.2021).

of Interior in matters of public security and National security^[35].

While the National Development Plan 2019-2024^[36] includes both proposals in the first section entitled "Politics and Government", establishing, among others, the following objectives of the National Public Security Strategy: rethink national security and reorient the Armed Forces and establish the National Guard^[37].

In the case of the Armed Forces, the commitment taken is that the military instrument keeps "[...] its constitutional tasks in the preservation of the national security and territorial integrity of the country, the defense of national sovereignty and assistance to the population in cases of disaster [...]".

Regarding the creation of the National Guard, it is based on the recognition that "Given the lack of a national corporation of professional police, capable of facing the challenge of insecurity and violence, it is necessary to continue to have the military institutions in the preservation and recovery of public security and the fight against crime for a period of five years, ending in 2023, while the formation of the National Guard is completed [...]".

For the head of the Executive Branch, the essential characteristics of this new coercive instrument considered "essential in the prevention of crime, the preservation of public security, the recovery of peace and the fight against crime throughout the country", are the following:

1. Permanent institution of a police nature, in charge of tasks of prevention and combat of crime, with a focus on social proximity and full respect for human rights;

2. Assigned to the SCSP, whose head will preside over the command body in charge of strategic and tactical aspects. This body will consist of a Board of Chiefs of Staff composed of members of the Security, National Defense and Marine ministries;

3. It is conceived as an institution of mixed or intermediate character, as an organ with civil command, composed of members with training, hierarchy, discipline and structure of military character;

4. Will act in a subsidiary manner and in support of state and municipal police;

5. In its initial phase the new corporation will have members from the Military Police, the Naval Police and the Federal Police^[38].

While the six-year objectives of the National Guard are more ambitious than the "Peace and Security Plan 2018-2024" background, because the objectives contemplate a "[...] growth up to 140 thousand elements and the coverage of 266 regions distributed in the 32 states of Mexico [...]"; giving priority in coverage to the most violent and conflictive areas

It should be noted that in the call launched by the SCSP for the entry of applicants to the National Guard, the 12 recruitment centers are military facilities located throughout Mexico.

[35] Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal. / Ministry of the Interior. // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 30 November 2018. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5545331&fecha=30/11/2018 (access mode: 01.02.2021).

[36] Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024. / Ministry of the Interior. // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 12 July 2019. – URL: <https://www.gob.mx/cenace/acciones-y-programas/plan-nacional-de-desarrollo-2019-2024-195029> (access mode: 18.02.2021).

[37] Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública. / Ministry of the Interior // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 16 May 2019. – P. 35. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5560463&fecha=16/05/2019 (access mode: 28.01.2021).

[38] López Obrador A.M. Primer Informe de Gobierno 2018-2019. – 1 September 2019. – URL: <https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/09/01/primer-informe-de-gobierno/> (access mode: 25.01.2021).

The National Development Plan, is based on the objective 8 “Public security, national security and peace” of the National Public Security Strategy^[39] published approximately one month before.

Among the contents of the document, not contemplated in the National Development Plan, it is worth mentioning:

-To strengthen and maintain the country's Internal Security and guarantee the external defense of Mexico, with the participation of the Armed Forces and the National Guard;

-The Directorate of the National Guard will be integrated by the Secretary of Citizen Security and Protection, who will have the top position in the direction, but also by the Ministries of Defense and Navy. This will improve coordination between these institutions;

-Acceptance that “[...] while the National Guard develops its structure, capabilities and territorial implementation, the Armed Forces will continue to provide its collaboration for Public Security”^[40].

This may explain, in part, that it is a two-star General who is entrusted with the command of the National Guard. To comply with the “requirement” of having a civilian exercising the command, “the commander of the Guard National, DEM Brigadier General Luis Rodríguez Bucio, retired from active service of the Mexican Army and Air Force on August 31”, according to EFE News agency^[41]. In short, a retired General is

the head of the National Guard, as if with his retirement and putting his uniform aside he abandons his military status and culture.

In that order, for the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights^[42], among other NGOs, the proposal to create a national guard has no other meaning than to militarize public security. Hence its strong opposition to the said institution having functions of prevention, investigation, detention and presentation of detainees, because:

a) The creation of the national guard is a verifiable threat to human rights since the increase in the illegal and excessive use of force, as well as the arbitrary deprivation of liberty/detention, extrajudicial executions, torture and forced disappearance have been documented.

b) The creation of the national guard is contrary to the international assessments and recommendations of international organizations and experts.

c) The militarized model of the national guard for public security tasks, weakens civil control and accepts military intervention, putting human rights, institutions and legal procedures (basis of democracy) at risk.

d) The creation of a national guard that is responsible for preventing and combating crime implies the institutionalization of a military regime in the country's public security policy.

[39] Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública. / Ministry of the Interior // Official Gazette of the Federation. –16 May 2019. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=55604638&fecha=16/05/2019 (access mode: 28.01.2021).

[40] Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública. / Ministry of the Interior // Official Gazette of the Federation. –16 May 2019. – P. 34, 44, 45. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=55604638&fecha=16/05/2019 (access mode: 28.01.2021).

[41] El comandante de la Guardia Nacional mexicana se jubila del Ejército. // EFE Noticias. – 3 September 2019. – URL: <https://www.efe.com/efe/usa/mexico/el-comandante-de-la-guardia-nacional-mexicana-se-jubila-del-ejercito/50000100-4056057> (access mode: 10.01.2021).

[42] La propuesta del Presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador de militarizar la seguridad pública a través de la creación de una guardia nacional. // Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights. – 2019. – P. 3 – URL: <http://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-propuesta-amlo-militarizacion-con-la-guardia-nacional.pdf> (access mode: 28.01.2021).

In general, there is a clear stance against the National Guard of most of the analysts and representatives of civil society who participated in the public consultation hearings related the National Guard convened by the Political Coordination Board of the LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Union, held on January 8 – 9th 2019.

Beyond the opposing voices, in the First Annual Report of the President – which accounts for the activities carried out from December 2018 to August 2019 – the creation of the National Guard is confirmed with the amendments or adoption of the following 3 legal instruments:

- Decree by which various provisions of the Constitution of the United States of Mexico are reformed, added and derogated in matters of National Guard.

- Decree issuing the National Guard Law^[43].

- Regulation of the National Guard Law^{[44][45]}.

Under the Law^[46], the National Guard is a decentralized administrative body of the Secretariat of Citizen Security and Protection, whose purpose is to perform the function of public security in charge of the Federation.

The regulation establishes that the National Guard has technical, operational and administrative autonomy for the exercise of its attributions, obligations, powers, and, the dealing of matters within its competence ^[47].

For Luis Raúl González Pérez, President of the National Commission on Human Rights: “The hybrid nature and characteristics of the body that is intended to be created, rather than giving certainty, will generate confusion and it will open areas of vulnerability for its integration and operation”^[48].

In other words: “These basic agreements that the National Guard is federalist and civilian will cease. From being a federalist to being an instrument of the central government, and also from being civilian to being professional”, according to Alejandro Madrazo Lajous, Coordinator of the Drug Policy Program a CIDE institution^[49].

THE CHOICE FOR INTERMEDIATE FORCES IN MEXICO

In light of the political decision to create the National Guard instead of starting from existing coercive instruments such as the Federal Police and its Gendarmerie Division, it is worth asking why adopting a new model. A security analyst responds

[43] Ley de la Guardia Nacional. // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 27 May 2019. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5561285&fecha=27/05/2019 (access mode: 28.01.2020).

[44] Reglamento de la Ley de la Guardia Nacional. Official Gazette of the Federation. – 29 June 2019. – URL: <https://www.dof.gob.mx/index.php?year=2019&month=06&day=29> (access mode: 28.01.2020).

[45] López Obrador A.M. Primer Informe de Gobierno 2018-2019. – 1 September 2019. – P. 35. – URL: <https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2019/09/01/primer-informe-de-gobierno/> (access mode: 25.01.2021).

[46] Ley de la Guardia Nacional. // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 27 May 2019. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5561285&fecha=27/05/2019 (access mode: 28.01.2020).

[47] Reglamento de la Ley de la Guardia Nacional. Official Gazette of the Federation. – 29 June 2019. – URL: <https://www.dof.gob.mx/index.php?year=2019&month=06&day=29> (access mode: 28.01.2020).

[48] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 62.

[49] Ibid. – P. 118.

to this question: “[...] The weakness of the Mexican institutions allows and encourages their redesign every six years, the political promises and the need to create a unique seal of each administration lead to a perpetual change that helps very little to the solution of the problems that affect the society [...]”^[50].

Precisely, both the creation of the Gendarmerie during the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), and of the National Guard in the current administration headed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024), illustrate the tendency to undo all the measures adopted by the previous administration and “reinvent” the security-intelligence apparatus.

As a result, the unwanted effects are high costs, endemic staff turnover – especially those qualified, with university degrees, senior management – and inhibits institutional development.

In other words, Mexico lacks state policies, understood as: “those that follow up relevant national issues and commit to the strategic interest of the country. Their conception, application and first results imply periods that go far beyond the temporality of a government’s [mandate]”^[51]. The absence of State policies in the different dimensions of the security is felt, heavily, in a Mexico suffering from endemic violence according to the standards of the World Health Organization (WHO).

Javier Oliva Posada, an academic at the UNAM, expressed it bluntly during his appearance before the Congress: “Why are we gathered here? Because the civil authority is asking the military to intervene, the military have not raised their hands to intervene. In all cases it has been the civil authorities with their improvisations”^[52].

In the words of Miguel Concha Malo, General Director of the Human Rights Center Fray Francisco de Vitoria: “[...] The large attribution of faculties and the prominence granted to the Armed Forces in this initiative translates into an unacceptable recognition of the inability of the civil authorities to face the challenges of insecurity in the country, which is politically and legally extremely dangerous”^[53].

Although the most serious issue, as highlighted by Ernesto López Portillo, academic at the IberoAmerican University is that “when the decision makers based their actions in the intuition and they do not gather the theoretical knowledge and the systematized empirical evidence [...] The decision makers accept or not to enter in the interpretation of the complexity of the security. When they accept it then they recognize the relevance of the evidence [...] the problem here in Mexico is that the vast majority of those who make public policy decisions decide not to know, or to know only generalities, to repeat unproven assumptions, to use

[50] Jiménez F. El fin de la Policía Federal y el incierto futuro de la Guardia Nacional. CIS Pensamiento Estratégico. Consultores en Inteligencia y Seguridad. – 25 July 2019. – P.1. – URL: <http://cisestrategico.com/?s=El+fin+de+la+Polic%C3%ADa+Federal+y+el+incierto+futuro+de+la+Guardia+Nacional> (access mode: 25.02.2020).

[51] Escobar S.S. La política de defensa como política del Estado. – Caracas: Revista Nueva Sociedad, july-august 1995. – Vol. 138. – P. 74. – URL: https://static.nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/2432_1.pdf (access mode: 25.02.2020).

[52] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 37.

[53] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 77.

the most popular rhetoric and connect with the great open-air auditorium, not because it offers a policy based on proven causalities or at least under controlled experimentation, but because it knows how to sell the promise. [...] The entire narrative of the National Guard proposal, as was the narrative of the Interior Security Law, is based on a promise that is not anchored in evidence that allows interpreting causal relationships. [...]”^[54].

Hence, “[...] the militarization of public security does not solve in depth the problem that Mexico is experiencing. It is not a matter of parties or people, but of evidence and results [...] what is being proposed with the National Guard is more of the same that we had had, we want to resolve the different violence in this country with a single response, a reactive response, a punitive response that is not addressing the causes or origins. That it is not identifying factors of risk, that it is not turning those risk actors into protection factors”, as highlighted by Edna Jaime, founder and general director of México Evalúa^[55].

All this aggravated by a context of endemic violence, since: “In a decade (2007-2017) 242,086 people were killed, representing 77 percent of the homicides committed since the beginning of the 21st century”^[56].

Alfonso Durazo Montaña, Secretary of Civilian Security and Protection (SCSP), exposes the three essential aspects that lead to the creation of the National Guard:

“First, recognizing that Mexico is facing a national insecurity crisis that has already become a national emergency situation. Second, the attention of this emergency requires the integration of a security force in the shortest possible time to recover the peace and calm of the society. And third, the imperative of optimizing the use of the different resources available to the Mexican State within the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA), Ministry of Navy (SEMAR), the Federal Police, the SCSP and other related institutions”^[57].

The Division General Luis Crescencio Sandoval González, Ministry of Defense, insists on how the National Guard should operate: “As already mentioned, we will receive the policies, strategies, plans, from the Secretariat of Civilian Security and Protection. We, SEDENA, the Armed Forces, are going to operate through the National Guard [...] the hard core of the National Guard will be composed of military and naval personnel; although only at the beginning, since we are going to be recruiting civilians and there will be a time when that structure is going to be completely of people who come from civil life to be part of that National Guard, but now we need a structure that provides us the confidence, the ease, and the possibility of developing the National Guard”^[58].

This new institution is questioned by experts under the following arguments:

For Ernesto López Portillo, “The National Guard, with what we know so far, looks

[54] Ibid. – P. 44-45.

[55] Ibid. – P. 96-97, 100-101.

[56] Portilla Tinajero R. Políticas públicas y violencia. La relación entre la acción pública de los gobiernos estatales y la violencia generada por el crimen organizado en México: PhD thesis. – Universidad de Guadalajara, 2019. – P. 1.

[57] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 20.

[58] Ibid. – P. 25.

much more like a model that in the theory is known as the doctrine of occupation. There is no official text or speech to associate it with a model of police in democratic countries”^[59].

Catalina Pérez Correa, at CIDE further endorses this idea by saying that: “It does not work, because it is based on an occupation logic that does not allow civilians and local governments to be in charge of the security, and there is no lasting security model that works without the participation of the society and that can be imposed from the outside”^[60].

According to Alejandro Hope Pinson, Director of the MC2 project, Less Crime, Less Punishment, “The existing intermediate bodies have characteristics that clearly differ from the National Guard that is being discussed today and that take it away from the models that are invoked as inspiration:

a. They complement, but do not replace the police. The Gendarmerie and the National Police coexist in France. Similarly in Spain between the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. As well as in Italy the Carabinieri and the State Police.

b. The gendarmeries usually have geographically bounded missions. They are usually deployed in rural areas and small towns. For urban areas, police forces are used.

c. Increasingly, these intermediate bodies have been transferred from the ministries of defense to the ministries

of the interior, this is the case of Spain, France and Chile”^[61].

For Conrado López Hernández, postulating lawyer and former officer of the Army and the preventive police, “A National Guard anywhere in the world is constituted by the civilians, not by the military. Even a National Guard must be superior to its own Armed Forces, it must even be the counterweight, to serve as a counterweight to a threat, including a coup d’état, because the National Guard must be made up of civilians. It is generally the National Guard at the service of each federative entity, as established by the Constitution [...]”^[62].

Indeed, the institution already in place is of a centralist nature, so the states lose the coercive instrument that they should have under normal circumstances. It responds, thus, to the guidelines of the federal government and probably to a state-centric conception of security. This means that the Mexican National Guard denatures and distorts the federal spirit of this force, as well as its civilian and voluntary character.

It is worth asking if the National Guard already in force continues with the militarization of public security, because its Commander is a military, the Unit Coordinations are Battalion, Company, Section, Platoon and Squadron^[63], the Inter-Institutional Operational Coordination, of a permanent nature, is composed of representatives of the SCSP, Ministry

[59] Ibid. – P. 47.

[60] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 106.

[61] Ibid. – P. 52-53.

[62] Ibid. – P. 40.

[63] Reglamento de la Ley de la Guardia Nacional. Official Gazette of the Federation. – 29 June 2019. – URL: <https://www.dof.gob.mx/index.php?year=2019&month=06&day=29> (access mode: 28.01.2020).

of National Defense, and the Ministry of Navy^[64], it presents a profile of militarized police or intermediate force, based on the command-obedience relationship, that is, of a vertical nature, composed largely of armed forces, and whose main function is reactive by its own essential characteristics and composition.

Again Alejandro Hope Pinson, answers this question in an affirmative way because: "[The Executive Power] seek only to solve the contradiction between the need to continue having, in the short term, military support in matters of public security and the lack of a legal and constitutional framework for its intervention [...] it may be that the objective is not only to solve this legal problem but having also the purpose of establishing an intermediate body of military nature for purposes of territorial control as it is the case in European countries [...]"^[65].

Fernando Ríos Martínez, Executive Secretary of the National Network of Civil Human Rights Organizations, "All Rights for Everyone", emphasizes that: "In the current debate there is a very strong ambiguity, it is a hybrid system, this has been pointed out, but the budget, training and doctrine are under the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA), which needs to be clarified precisely so that this ambiguity is eliminated"^[66].

Alberto Erubiel Tirado Cervantes emphasizes the heterogeneity of its composition: "This is a hybrid, whose main weakness lies in the recruitment process and the question of formal education. Indeed, this hybrid is being formed with

federal policemen who are required, at least, a high school diploma; and also by military that only have primary or secondary school completed [...] I am raising hard data and facts. This conjunction shows us a heterogeneous conglomerate that, in order to standardize them in criteria of formation and attention in functions of public security and civilian attention, generates a problem and a learning curve that will take more than 10 or 15 years"^[67].

The Law of the National Guard, in its transitory articles, contemplates the extinction of the Federal Police, a corporation that must transfer –gradually– its human, financial and material resources to the National Guard. In this way, the death certificate of the Federal Police, including its Gendarmerie division, is signed, and the financial, material and human resources that were put by the previous administration of Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012) and Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) will be lost.

This decision ends the historic opportunity to develop a civilian police under the central government in Mexico.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE MILITARIZATION OF PUBLIC SECURITY?

In contrast, the United States National Guard and the French Gendarmerie Nationale are maintained and consolidated throughout the years –beyond the government in turn–. Furthermore, these institutions generate intangibles elements such as traditions (including myths), symbols,

[64] Ibid.

[65] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 49.

[66] Ibid. – P. 56.

[67] Ibid. – P. 114.

strategic thinking and doctrine, mysticism of service, sense of belonging or principle of identity of its members, leadership, trust, loyalty, integrity, prestige, and spirit de corps; with positive effects that transcends any political agendas.

Additionally, they professionally retain and develop enrolled personnel and the process of formation and training of the human critical mass is continuous and constant; what is reflected in the organizational results and in the high social recognition they enjoy.

Both intermediate forces are born in the heat of the bourgeois revolutions of the late eighteenth century, adapt to changing environmental circumstances, and coexist with civil police; given that 75 percent of nation-states opt for the civil police model and civilian controls^[68].

On the contrary, the Mexican governments of the last decade are committed to a police model based on the militarization characterized by its centralization and hierarchy composed of military commanders. While the global trend is characterized by the demilitarization of police institutions encouraging decentralization processes and mission-type orders.

Paradoxically, the process of militarization of the public security apparatus takes place under democratic governments of political alternation^{[69] [70]}.

Pedro Salazar Ugarte, Director of the Institute of Legal Research of the UNAM believes that: "[...] the proposal to create a National Guard imply constitutionalizing the militarization of the country"^[71].

For Alberto Erubiel Tirado Cervantes, an academic at the Universidad Iberoamericana, the National Guard translates into the consolidation of a permanent state of exception: "If, with the military police operations, mini states of emergency were not declared, with the simple intervention of the federal Executive through the National Guard, the State of emergency becomes permanent, denying our federalist essence and denying constitutional controls to which the Mexican State is bound"^[72].

Currently, the state of force of the National Guard is estimated at 76,000 troops, which is double the extinct federal police. However, its results are poor, since in the second half of 2019 alone there were 35,588 intentional homicides.

But its main failure was the "Culiacán" operation of October 17, 2019, whose objective was the arrest of Ovidio Guzmán López, son of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, who, faced with threats and the firepower of the Sinaloa cartel, was released by the National Guard, with a balance

[68] Sánchez Valdés V. M. Seguridad pública en el mundo: ¿quién está al mando? – Nexos, 7 January 2019. – URL: <https://seguridad.nexos.com.mx/seguridad-publica-en-el-mundo-quien-esta-al-mando/> (access mode: 10.01.2021).

[69] Moloeznik M.P. Tratado sobre Pensamiento Estratégico-Militar. Enseñanzas para el sistema de defensa de México. – Mexico: Colectivo de Análisis de la Seguridad en Democracia, A.C. (CASEDE), 2018. – P. 485 – URL: <https://www.casede.org/index.php/biblioteca-casede-2-0/defensa-y-fuerzas-armadas/fuerzas-armadas-mexicanas/410-tratado-sobre-pensamiento-estrategico-militar> (access mode: 10.01.2021).

[70] militarización de la seguridad pública en América Latina. / Moloeznik, M.P. and Medina Nuñez I. – Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2019.

[71] Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. Libro blanco de la guardia nacional (Abordaje y análisis de expertos y actores nacionales e internacionales) / Moloeznik M.P. and Bravo Aguilar N.T. // The LXIV Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. – Mexico City, 8-9 January. – P. 84.

[72] Ibid. – P. 110.

of eight dead, 16 wounded and the escape of 51 inmates from the Aguarruto prison^[73].

In conclusion, the option of intermediate forces of the last two Mexican governments consolidates the process of militarization of the public security, which with Andrés Manuel López Obrador takes to its maximum expression by creating the National Guard.

The presidential agreement that the Armed Forces have to carry out public security tasks to the aid of the National Guard will add five more years of military intervention in the streets^[74].

It should be noted that this decree gives soldiers many of the same responsibilities as members of the civilian police forces, such as arresting suspects, securing crime scenes, and executing arrest warrants.

In summary, and according to WOLA^[75], “[...] the militarization of public security for more than a decade –since former President Felipe Calderón began the massive deployment of soldiers in the country in 2006 – has failed to reduce violence and instead, it has led to massive human rights violations”; what to expect from the National Guard “Mexican style”.

[73] #LoMásLeído Octubre 2019: El operativo fallido en Culiacán, versiones y reacciones. // El Informador. – 31 December 2019. – URL: <https://www.informador.mx/LoMasLeido-October-2019-El-operativo-fallido-en-Culiacan-versiones-y-reacciones-t201912300004.html> (access mode: 10.02.2021).

[74] ACUERDO por el que se dispone de la Fuerza Armada permanente para llevar a cabo tareas de seguridad pública de manera extraordinaria, regulada, fiscalizada, subordinada y complementaria. // Official Gazette of the Federation. – 2020. – URL: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5593105&fecha=11/05/202 (access mode: 23.02.2021).

[75] Maureen Meyer Un año después de la creación de la Guardia Nacional, México está lejos de desmilitarizar la seguridad pública. // Washington Office on Latin America. – 26 May 2020.

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10. Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública. / Government of Mexico. // *Gaceta*. – 1 February 2019. – URL: https://infosen.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/64/1/2019-02-01-1/assets/documentos/Estrategia_Seguridad.pdf (дата обращения: 15.01.2021).

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